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According to the quantum de Finetti theorem, if the state of an N-partite system is invariant
under permutations of the subsystems then it can be approximated by a state where almost all
subsystems are identical copies of each other, provided N is sufficiently large compared to the
dimension of the subsystems. The de Finetti theorem has various applications in physics and
information theory, where it is for instance used to prove the security of quantum cryptographic
schemes. Here, we extend de Finetti’s theorem, showing that the approximation also holds for infinite
dimensional systems, as long as the state satisfies certain experimentally verifiable conditions. This
is relevant for applications such as quantum key distribution (QKD), where it is often hard—or
even impossible—to bound the dimension of the information carriers (which may be corrupted by
an adversary). In particular, our result can be applied to prove the security of QKD based on weak
coherent states or Gaussian states against general attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems studied in physics often consist of a large num-
ber of identical subsystems. Examples include any type
of matter with the individual molecules as subsystems, or
a light field consisting of many modes. Similarly, in the
context of quantum information processing, one typically
considers settings involving a large number of identical
information carriers, such as the photons sent over an
optical fiber. In all these cases, the state of the overall
system is described by a density operator on a product
space H⊗N .
A main difficulty when studying large composite sys-
tems is that their dimension, and hence the number of
parameters needed to describe their state, grows expo-
nentially in the number N of subsystems. This is partic-
ularly problematic if one wants to prove that a certain
statement holds for all possible states of the system. In
the context of quantum information processing, the ne-
cessity of such proofs arises, for instance, when analyzing
the security of cryptographic protocols. Here, an adver-
sary may maliciously manipulate the information carri-
ers, and security must be guaranteed for any resulting
state.
The analysis of large composite quantum systems can
be vastly simplified under certain symmetry assumptions,
using a quantum version of de Finetti’s classical represen-
tation theorem [1] proposed recently in [2, 3]. The theo-
rem states that multi-partite density operators which are
invariant under permutations of the subsystems are ap-
proximated by convex combinations of density operators
which have i.i.d. structure σ⊗N on most subsystems [36].
I.i.d. states can be easily parametrized (they are charac-
terized by the state σ of a single subsystem), and a huge
variety of tools are available to handle them, particularly
in the area of information theory [4].
In information-theoretic applications, permutation
symmetry of the states can often be assumed to hold
without loss of generality due to inherent symmetries of
the underlying problem or the processing scheme. An
important example, which we are going to study in more
detail, is quantum key distribution (QKD) [5, 6]. Roughly
speaking, QKD is the art of establishing a secret key be-
tween two distant parties, traditionally called Alice and
Bob, connected only by an insecure quantum channel [37].
Most QKD protocols have the property that N signals
are exchanged sequentially between Alice and Bob, but
the order in which they are transmitted is irrelevant (as
long as Alice and Bob coordinate their communication).
One can thus equivalently assume that Alice and Bob
reorder the signals according to a randomly chosen per-
mutation [38]. Consequently, even if an adversary ma-
nipulates the signals in an arbitrarily malicious way, the
N -partite density operator describing Alice and Bob’s
information is permutation invariant.
The quantum de Finetti theorem now implies that, for
assessing the security of a QKD protocol, it is sufficient
to consider the special case where the state held by Alice
and Bob (after communication over the insecure channel)
has i.i.d. structure. This, however, exactly corresponds
to the situation arising in a collective attack [7, 8], where
the adversary is bound to manipulate each of the trans-
mitted signals independently and identically. For a large
class of protocols, security against collective attacks is
well understood and explicit formulas for the key rate
are known (see, e.g., [9] for the rate of key distillation
protocols with one-way communication).
The reduction of security proofs to the special case of
collective attacks, however, only works for QKD schemes
that use low-dimensional signals. This is because the de
Finetti representation for states on product spaces H⊗N
is subject to the constraint that the dimension d of the
subsystems H be sufficiently smaller than the number N
of subsystems. In particular, the de Finetti representa-
2tion generally fails if H is infinite-dimensional. (There
exist explicit examples of permutation invariant states
ρN on H⊗N , with dim(H) = N , such that any reduced
state ρk on H⊗k, for k ≥ 2, is highly entangled and,
hence, cannot be approximated by a convex combination
of i.i.d. states [10].)
Here, we show that the restriction of the de Finetti
representation to low-dimensional spaces H can be cir-
cumvented under certain experimentally verifiable condi-
tions. More precisely, we prove that for any permutation
invariant state on a (possibly infinite-dimensional) sys-
tem H⊗N , the reduced state on H⊗N ′ , for some N ′ ≈ N ,
is approximated by a mixture of density operators with
i.i.d. structure, provided that the outcomes of a mea-
surement applied to a few subsystems lie within a given
range. As a specific example, we consider measurements
with respect to two canonical observables X and Y on
H = L2(R). The criterion then is that the outcomes of
both the X and the Y measurements have small absolute
value.
In practical applications, this criterion is often easily
verifiable. For example, in continuous variable quantum
cryptography [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], which
uses signals in H = L2(R), measurements with respect
to two canonical observables X and Y are usually al-
ready part of the protocol. Our extended version of de
Finetti’s theorem then implies that these protocols are
secure against the most general attacks, provided they
are secure against collective attacks. The latter type of
security is already proved for many practical continuous
variable schemes (see, e.g., [20], which is based on [21],
and [22]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Af-
ter introducing some notation and terminology, we start
in Section III with the proof of the technical lemmas and
theorems. These are the building blocks for the deriva-
tion of our main claim that permutation invariant states
are approximated by almost i.i.d. states, as described in
Section IVA. (For a first reading, one may skip Sec-
tion III and directly start with Section IVA, where it is
shown how the individual technical claims are combined.)
Finally, we discuss how our result can be applied to prove
the security of QKD schemes (Section IVB).
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
A. Symmetry and permutation invariance
Let Sn be the set of permutations on {1, . . . , n} and let
H be a Hilbert space. The symmetric subspace of H⊗n,
denoted Symn(H), consists of all vectors Φ ∈ H⊗n such
that piΦ = Φ for all pi ∈ Sn. The projector on Symn(H)
can be written as
PSymn(H) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
pi . (1)
We denote by S(H) the set of density operators on the
Hilbert space H. An operator ρn ∈ S(H⊗n) is said to
be permutation invariant if piρnpi† = ρn for all permuta-
tions pi.
B. Restricted symmetric subspaces
Let H¯ be a subspace of H and let k, n ∈ N. We de-
fine P k+nH¯⊗n as the projector onto the subspace of H⊗k+n
spanned by all vectors in pi(H⊗k ⊗ H¯⊗n), for any pi ∈
Sk+n. The projector P
k+n
H¯⊗n can be decomposed into pro-
jectors P0 = PH¯ and P1 = PH¯⊥ onto H¯ and its orthogonal
subspace H¯⊥, respectively,
P k+nH¯⊗n =
∑
b∈{0,1}k+n
fb≤ kk+n
Pb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pbk+n , (2)
where the sum ranges over all bitstrings b =
(b1, . . . , bk+n) ∈ {0, 1}k+n whose relative frequency of 1s,
fb :=
1
k
∑
k
bi , (3)
is not larger than kk+n .
Because P k+nH¯⊗n is permutation invariant it commutes
with any pi ∈ Sk+n and, hence, also with the projec-
tor PSymk+n(H) onto the symmetric subspace of H⊗k+n
(see (1)). This implies that the product P k+nH¯⊗nPSymk+n(H)
is a projector. In the following, we denote by
Symk+n(H, H¯⊗n) the support of this projector. The
space Symk+n(H, H¯⊗n) thus consists of all symmetric
vectors that can be written as superpositions of vec-
tors of the form pi(Φ ⊗ Φ¯), for some Φ ∈ Symk(H),
Φ¯ ∈ Symn(H¯), and pi ∈ Sk+n.
In the special case where H¯ = span{ν} is the vector
space spanned by a single vector ν ∈ H, we also write
Symk+n(H, ν⊗n) instead of Symk+n(H, span{ν}⊗n) and
call its elements
(
k+n
n
)
-i.i.d. vectors (along ν). We also
say that a density operator ρk+n is almost i.i.d. if its
support is contained in Symk+n(H, ν⊗n), for some k ≪
n.
C. Measurements
Let U and V be nonnegative operators on a Hilbert
space H satisfying U ≤ 1 and V ≤ 1 . We define the
function γU→V on [0, 1] by
γU→V (δ) := sup{tr(V σ) : σ ∈ S(H); tr(Uσ) ≤ δ} . (4)
If U and V are POVM elements then γU→V (δ) corre-
sponds to the maximum probability of obtaining outcome
V when measuring a state σ for which the probability of
outcome U is at most δ.
3III. TECHNICAL STATEMENTS
A. Measurement statistics
Let U = {U0, U1} and V = {V0, V1} be two binary
POVMs on H with the property that γU1→V1(δ) is small
for small δ. In other words, for any state σ, outcome 1
of measurement V has small probability whenever out-
come 1 of measurement U has small probability. Intu-
itively, we would then expect that the following holds.
If k subsystems of a (k + n)-partite permutation invari-
ant state are measured according to U , resulting in a low
number of outcomes 1, then the number of outcomes 1
when measuring the n remaining subsystems according
to V is small, too. The following lemma makes this intu-
ition more precise.
Lemma III.1. Let U = {U0, U1} and V = {V0, V1} be
POVMs on H, let n ≥ 2k, and let (X1, . . . , Xk+n) be
the (k + n)-partite classical outcome of the measurement
U⊗k ⊗V⊗n applied to any permutation invariant ρk+n ∈
S(H⊗k+n). Then, for any δ > 0,
Pr
[
fXk+1···Xk+n > γU1→V1(fX1···Xk + δ) + δ
] ≤ 8k 32 e−kδ2 ,
where fX denotes the relative frequency of 1s in X
(see (3)).
Qualitatively, the statement of Lemma III.1 is a special
case of Lemma 4.1 of [23]. For completeness, we give a
proof in the appendix, which also yields tighter bounds
for the choice of parameters we are interested in.
B. Bounding the probability of projecting into a
low-dimensional subspace
In this section, we derive a bound on the quantity
γU1→V1 for the case where V1 corresponds to the pred-
icate that a measurement of X2 + Y 2, for two canonical
observables X and Y on H = L2(R), is larger than a
threshold n0, and where U1 is the predicate that the out-
come of a measurement with respect to either X2 or Y 2
is at least n02 .
For any Hermitian operator Z and z0 ∈ R we define
PZ≥z0 as the projector onto the subspace spanned by the
eigenspaces of Z corresponding to (generalized) eigenval-
ues z ≥ z0.
Lemma III.2. Let X and Y be two canonical operators
([X,Y ] = i), n0 a positive integer, and define
U1 :=
1
2
PX
2≥n0/2+
1
2
P Y
2≥n0/2 and V1 := PX
2+Y 2≥n0+1
Then γU1→V1(δ) ≤ 4δ+ 4c0√pin0 e−n0c
2
0 , with c0 = 1− 1√2 .
Proof. The proof consists of several steps. First, we de-
fine an operator W1 and show that V1 ≤ 2W1. Then we
show that, up to a constant, W1 is upper bounded by
2U1.
Let us start by defining
W1 :=
1
pi
∫
dµα |α〉〈α|
where |α〉 denotes a coherent state and the integral is ex-
tended to the complex plane with |α|2 ≥ n0. By expand-
ing W1 in the Fock basis, {|n〉f}∞n=0, one obtains that
W1 =
∑
qn|n〉f 〈n| with qn = Γ(n + 1, n0)/Γ(n + 1, 0),
where Γ is the incomplete Gamma function [24]. Since
qn+1 ≥ qn > 0, we can write V1 ≤ q−1n0 W1, where
q−1n0 = Γ(n0 + 1, 0)/Γ(n0 + 1, n0) < 2, which concludes
the first part.
For the second part, we first extend our Hilbert space
to H1 ⊗H2, and show that we can write
W1 =
∫
dxdy f 〈0|U(|x〉X〈x| ⊗ |y〉Y 〈y|)U †|0〉f , (5)
where the integral is defined for x, y ∈ R with the restric-
tion x2+y2 ≥ n0. Here |0〉f ∈ H2, and |x〉X,Y denote gen-
eralized eigenstates of X and Y , respectively. Further-
more, U = e
pi
4 (a1⊗a†2−a†1⊗a2) is the so–called beam splitter
operator [25], where a1,2 := (X1,2 + iY1,2)/
√
2 are the
annihilation operators acting on the first and second sys-
tem, respectively. This expression for W1 can be derived
by showing that |fx,y〉 :=f 〈0|U |x〉X ⊗ |y〉Y = pi−1/2|α〉,
with α = x+iy. This, in turn, can be proved by realizing
that it is an eigenstate of the annihilation operator,
a1|fx,y〉 =f 〈0|(a1 + a†2)U |x〉X ⊗ |y〉Y
= f 〈0|U(X1 + iY2)|x〉X ⊗ |y〉Y = (x+ iy)|fx,y〉,
where we have used the fact that f 〈0|a†2 = 0 and that
U †(a1 + a
†
2)U = X1 + iY2. The normalization factor can
be obtained by noting that the integral over the com-
plex plane of |α〉〈α| = pi1 . By looking at the integration
domain in (5) it is clear that W1 ≤ A+B, where
A =
∫
dxdx′ f 〈0|U(|x〉X〈x| ⊗ |x′〉X〈x′|)U †|0〉f ,
B =
∫
dxdx′ f 〈0|U(|x′〉Y 〈x′| ⊗ |x〉Y 〈x|)U †|0〉f ,
where the integral is restricted to |x|2 ≥ n0/2 and −∞ <
x < ∞, and we have used that the integral of |x′〉X〈x′|
is equal to that of |x′〉Y 〈x′|. Using U |x〉X ⊗ |x′〉X =
|(x+x′)/√2〉X ⊗|(x−x′)/
√
2〉X , |f 〈0|x〉X |2 = e−x2/
√
pi,
and changing variables in the integrals ([z′ = (x+x′)/
√
2,
z =
√
2x] we obtain
A =
1√
pi
∫
|z|2≥n0
dz e−(z−X)
2
=: F (X).
Analogously, B = F (Y ). It is straightforward to
show that for all a > 0, F (X) ≤ PX2≥a2 +
F (a), and similarly for F (Y ). Noting that F (a) ≤
(1/
√
pi)e−(
√
n0−a)2/(
√
n0−a), for a ∈ [0,√n0], and choos-
ing a =
√
n0/2 we conclude the proof.
4Lemma III.3 below is a corollary of Lemma III.1 and
Lemma III.2. It allows to restrict the support of a
(2k + n)-partite permutation invariant density operator,
provided that measurements of the two canonical opera-
torsX and Y on k subsystems only result in small values.
Lemma III.3. Let X and Y be two canonical operators
on H, let n ≥ 2k, let H¯ be the support of PX2+Y 2≤n0 , for
any n0 ≥ 12 ln 7(k+n)k , and let ρ2k+n be a permutation in-
variant density operator on H⊗2k+n. Let (Z1, . . . , Zk) be
the outcomes of measurements of k subsystems of ρ2k+n
with respect to X and Y (each chosen with probability 12)
and let F be the event that the projection P k+nH¯⊗n applied
to the remaining k + n subsystems fails. Then
Pr
[
(
k
max
i=1
Z2i <
n0
2
) ∧ F] ≤ 8k 32 e− k349(k+n)2 .
Proof. Let U1 and V1 be defined as in Lemma III.2.
Furthermore, let X1, . . . , Xk+n be the outcomes of the
POVM U⊗k ⊗ V⊗n defined by U = {1 − U1, U1} and
V = {1 −V1, V1}, as in Lemma III.1. The probability we
want to bound can then be rewritten as
Pr
[
(
k
max
i=1
Z2i <
n0
2
) ∧ F] = Pr[(fXk = 0) ∧ (fXn > kk+n )] .
where fXk and fXn are the frequencies of 1s in the tu-
ples Xk = (X1, . . . , Xk) and X
n = (Xk+1, . . . , Xk+n),
respectively. With δ := k7(k+n) , we have
γU1→V1(δ) + δ ≤ 5δ + 8√n0 e
− 112n0 ≤ kk+n ,
and, hence, the probability above can be bounded by
Pr
[
(fXk = 0) ∧ (fXn > kk+n )
]
≤ Pr[(fXk = 0) ∧ (fXn > γU1→V1(fXk + δ) + δ)]
≤ Pr[fXn > γU1→V1(fXk + δ) + δ] .
The claim then follows from Lemma III.1.
Remark III.4. It is straightforward to generalize
Lemma III.3 to other measurements, specified by an arbi-
trary POVM M = {Mz}z∈Z . The condition maxi Z2i <
n0
2 may then be replaced by the requirement that the out-
comes Zi are contained in a certain set Z¯ ⊆ Z such that
for any δ > 0
γU1→P⊥H¯ (δ) ≤ O(δ) ,
where U1 :=
∑
z /∈Z¯Mz and where P
⊥¯
H denotes the projec-
tion onto the subspace orthogonal to a finite-dimensional
subspace H¯, which may be chosen depending on δ. For
the considerations below (Section IVA), however, the di-
mension d of H¯ needs to be bounded by d ≤ O(δ− 32 ), so
that d ≤ O((nk )
3
2 ).
C. Purification in restricted symmetric subspaces
The de Finetti type statements formulated in Sec-
tion IIID below apply to states on the symmetric sub-
space. The following lemma, which is a generalization of
Lemma 4.2.2 of [3] (see also [10]), allows to extend these
statements to general permutation invariant density op-
erators.
Lemma III.5. Let H¯ be a subspace of H and let ρ2k+n ∈
S(H⊗2k+n) be permutation invariant with support con-
tained in the support of P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n . Then there exists a
purification of ρ2k+n on Sym
2k+n(H⊗H, (H¯ ⊗ H¯)⊗n).
Proof. Let {ej}j∈J be an orthonormal basis of H such
that {ej}j∈K , for some K ⊂ J , is a basis of H¯. We can
then define a vector Φ ∈ (H⊗H)⊗2k+n by
Φ =
∑
j∈J2k+n
(ρ2k+n ⊗ 1⊗2k+nH )ej ⊗ ej (6)
where, for any j = (j1, . . . , j2k+n) ∈ J2k+n,
ej = ej1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ej2k+n .
The state defined by Φ is obviously a purification of
ρ2k+n. Furthermore, because ρ2k+n is permutation in-
variant, we have for any pi ∈ S2k+n
(pi ⊗ pi)Φ = (pi ⊗ pi)
∑
j∈J2k+n
(ρ2k+n ⊗ 1⊗2k+nH )ej ⊗ ej
=
∑
j∈J2k+n
(ρ2k+n ⊗ 1⊗2k+nH )(piej ⊗ piej) = Φ
and, hence, Φ ∈ Sym2k+n(H ⊗ H). It thus remains to
verify that Φ is an element of the support of P 2k+n
(H¯⊗H¯)⊗n .
Since ρ2k+n is contained in the support of P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n , the
sum in (6) can be restricted to terms such that ej lies in
the support of P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n , too (or, equivalently, the tuple j
has at most k entries outside J). This implies that Φ lies
in the support of P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n ⊗ P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n . The assertion then
follows because this support is contained in the support
of P 2k+n
(H¯⊗H¯)⊗n .
D. An extended de Finetti-type theorem
The purpose of this section is to derive a de Finetti-
type theorem for states on the symmetric subspace
of product spaces with possibly infinite-dimensional
subsystems (Theorem III.7). We start, however,
with a de Finetti-type statement for finite dimensions
(Lemma III.6). It can be seen as a strengthened version
of the exponential de Finetti theorem proposed in [3].
The claim is that any (2k + n)-partite symmetric vector
Φ is approximated by a superposition of vectors that are(
k+n
n
)
-i.i.d. on k + n subsystems. We note that, in con-
trast, the approximation in [3] has the form of a convex
5combination of
(
k+n
n
)
-i.i.d. states. A second difference
between Lemma III.6 and the result of [3] is that we use
the overlap (i.e., the scalar product between vectors) in-
stead of the trace distance to quantify the quality of the
approximation (this slightly simplifies the argument be-
low).
Lemma III.6. Let H be a d-dimensional Hilbert space
and let k, n ∈ N. There exists an isometry U from H⊗k
to a Hilbert space H′ with orthonormal basis {fν}ν∈V ,
where V is a finite set of unit vectors ν ∈ H, such that
the following holds. For any unit vector Φ ∈ Sym2k+n(H)
there exists a unit vector Φˆ ∈ H′⊗Symk+n(H) of the form
Φˆ =
√
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
fν ⊗ Φˆν (7)
with Φˆν ∈ Symk+n(H, ν⊗n) such that
〈Φˆ|(U ⊗ 1⊗k+n)Φ〉 > 1− kde− k(k+1)2k+n . (8)
Note that (8) can be rewritten in terms of the fidelity
F (·, ·) as
F (Φˆ, (U ⊗ 1⊗k+n)Φ) > 1− kde− k(k+1)2k+n .
The de Finetti theorem of [3] (Theorem 4.3.2) can then
be obtained by taking the partial trace over H′ in both
arguments of F (·, ·) and converting the fidelity into a
trace distance.
Proof. The unitary group acts irreducibly on the sub-
space Symk(H). Hence, by Schur’s lemma,∫
U⊗k(|ν0〉〈ν0|)⊗k(U †)⊗kω(U) = 1dim(Symk(H))PSymk(H)
where ν0 is an arbitrary unit vector in H and where ω is
the Haar measure on the set of unitaries on H. Note that
the integral on the left hand side can be approximated to
any accuracy by a sum over a finite set V of unit vectors
ν ∈ H. That is, for any µ > 0 there exists a finite set V
such that∥∥∥ 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
(|ν〉〈ν|)⊗k − 1
dim(Symk(H))PSymk(H)
∥∥∥ ≤ µ .
LetH′ a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {fν}ν∈V
and define the linear map U˜ from H⊗k to H′ by
U˜ :=
√
dim(Symk(H))√
|V|
∑
ν∈V
|fν〉〈ν⊗k| .
We then have
U˜ †U˜ = dim(Sym
k(H))
|V|
∑
ν∈V
|ν⊗k〉〈ν⊗k|
and, consequently,∥∥U˜ †U˜ − PSymk(H)∥∥ ≤ µ .
In particular, U˜ can be made arbitrarily close to the isom-
etry
U := U˜(U˜ †U˜)−
1
2
on Symk(H), i.e., for any µ′ > 0 there exists a finite set
V such that ∥∥U˜ − U‖ ≤ µ′ .
It thus remains to be shown that inequality (8) holds for
U˜ (because it then also holds for the isometry U , provided
µ′ is sufficiently small).
By the definition of U˜ , the vector (U˜ ⊗ 1⊗k+n)Φ can
be written as
(U˜ ⊗ 1⊗k+n)Φ =
√
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
fν ⊗ Φν
where
Φν :=
√
dim(Symk(H))(〈ν|⊗k ⊗ 1 k+n)Φ ∈ H⊗k+n .
We now define the vector Φˆ by choosing each Φˆν of
the sum (7) as the projection of Φν onto the subspace
Symk+n(H, ν⊗n),
Φˆν := PSymk+n(H,ν⊗n)Φν .
Note that the length of the resulting vector Φˆ is gen-
erally smaller than 1. However, the statement for unit
vectors can be obtained by normalizing Φˆ (because the
normalization can only increase the overlap).
Condition (8) (with U replaced by U˜) can now be
rewritten as
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
〈Φν |PSymk+n(H,ν⊗n)|Φν〉 > 1− kde−
k(k+1)
2k+n , (9)
or, equivalently, as
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
〈Φν |P⊥Symk+n(H,ν⊗n)|Φν〉 < kde−
k(k+1)
2k+n , (10)
because 1|V|
∑
ν∈V〈Φν |Φν〉 ≥ 1− µ, for any µ > 0.
A straightforward calculation (cf. Eq. (4.12) of [3]
or the supplementary material of [2] for a similar but
more detailed argument) shows that, for any vector Ψ ∈
Sym2k+n(H),
〈Ψ|(|ν〉〈ν|)⊗k ⊗ P⊥Symk+n(H,ν⊗n)|Ψ〉 ≤
(
k+n
k+1
)
(
2k+n
k+1
)
≤
(k + n− 1
2k + n
)k
< e−
k(k+1)
2k+n .
Applying this bound to the individual terms in the
sum (10) gives
〈Φν |P⊥Symk+n(H,ν⊗n)|Φν〉 < dim(Symk(H))e−
k(k+1)
2k+n
≤ kde− k(k+1)2k+n .
This implies (10) and thus concludes the proof.
6Based on Lemma III.6, we now derive a de Finetti-
type theorem that applies to states ρ4k+n on the symmet-
ric subspace Sym4k+n(H, H¯⊗3k+n), where H¯ is a finite-
dimensional subspace of a possibly infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space H. The claim is that, when tracing out
the first 2k subsystems, the resulting state ρ2k+n =
tr2k(ρ
4k+n) is close to a convex combination of
(
2k+n
n
)
-
i.i.d. states ρˆ2k+nν . Here, closeness is measured in terms
of the fidelity F (·, ·).
Theorem III.7. Let H¯ be a d-dimensional subspace of a
Hilbert space H, let n, k ∈ N, and let ρ4k+n be a density
operator on Sym4k+n(H, H¯⊗3k+n). Then there exists a
probability distribution pν on a finite set V of unit vectors
ν ∈ H¯ and a family {ρˆ2k+nν }ν∈V of density operators on
Sym2k+n(H, ν⊗n) such that
F
(
ρ2k+n,
∑
ν∈V
pν ρˆ
2k+n
ν
)
> 1− kde− k(k+1)4k+n . (11)
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim for ρ4k+n pure; the
statement for general density operators follows by the
joint concavity of the fidelity (see, e.g., Chapter 9 of [4]).
Let thus Ψ ∈ Sym4k+n(H, H¯⊗3k+n). The idea is to write
Ψ as a superposition of vectors Ψj,j′ which have at least
2k + n subsystems contained in H¯ (see (15) and (16)
below) so that we can apply Lemma III.6 to each of them
individually.
Consider the decomposition of P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n according
to (2), i.e.,
P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n =
∑
b∈{0,1}2k+n
fb≤ k2k+n
Pb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pb2k+n (12)
with P0 = PH¯ and P1 = PH¯⊥ . Furthermore, let {ej}j∈J
be a common eigenbasis of the projectors PH¯ and PH¯⊥ ,
let J0 := J ∪ {0} (assuming that 0 /∈ J), and define the
projectors Qj, for j ∈ J0, by
Qj =
{
PH¯ if j = 0
|ej〉〈ej | if j ∈ J .
Then, starting from (12), it is easy to construct a decom-
position of P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n into mutually orthogonal projectors
Qj′ = Qj′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qj′2k+n , for j′ = (j′1, . . . , j′2k+n),
P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n =
∑
j′∈J2k+nk+n
Qj′ , (13)
where J2k+nk+n is a subset of J
2k+n
0 containing only tuples
j′ with exactly k+n indices τ such that j′τ = 0. Similarly,
we can decompose P 2kH¯⊗k in projectors Qj = Qj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
Qj2k , for j = (j1, . . . , j2k),
P 2kH¯⊗k =
∑
j∈J2kk
Qj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qj2k , (14)
where J2kk only consists of tuples j ∈ J2k0 with exactly k
indices τ such that jτ = 0.
By definition, Sym4k+n(H, H¯⊗3k+n) is contained in
the support of P⊗4k+nH¯⊗3k+n , which is itself contained in the
support of P 2kH¯⊗k ⊗ P 2k+nH¯⊗k+n . Hence, any vector Ψ ∈
Sym4k+n(H, H¯⊗3k+n) can be written as a superposition
Ψ =
∑
j∈J2kk
Ψj (15)
where, for any j ∈ J2kk ,
Ψj = (Qj ⊗ 1⊗2k+n)Ψ =
∑
j′∈J2k+nk+n
Ψj,j′ (16)
with Ψj,j′ = Qj ⊗ Qj′Ψ. In particular, because of the
orthogonality of the projectors Qj, we can write ρ
2k+n as
a convex combination
ρ2k+n = tr2k(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) =
∑
j∈J2kk
tr2k(|Ψj〉〈Ψj|)
=
∑
j∈J2kk
pjρ
2k+n
j
with probabilities pj = tr(|Ψj〉〈Ψj|) and density operators
ρ2k+nj = tr2k(|Ψ˜j〉〈Ψ˜j|) ,
where Ψ˜j is a unit vector parallel to Ψj. Because of the
joint concavity of the fidelity, it is thus sufficient to show
that (11) holds for all density operators ρ2k+nj .
Let thus j ∈ J2kk be fixed and let, for any j′ ∈ J2k+nk+n ,
Ψ˜j,j′ be a normalization of Ψj,j′ . We then have
Ψ˜j =
∑
j′∈J2k+nk+n
αj,j′Ψ˜j,j′
where αj,j′ are coefficients satisfying
∑
j′ |αj,j′ |2 = 1.
We now apply Lemma III.6 to each of the vectors
Ψ˜j,j′ in the sum individually. For this, assume with-
out loss of generality that j = (j1, . . . , jk, 0, . . . , 0)
and j′ = (0, . . . , 0, j′k+n+1, · · · , j′2k+n) with
j1, . . . , jk, j
′
k+n+1, . . . , j
′
2k+n ∈ J (this form can al-
ways be obtained by an appropriate reordering of the
subsystems). The vector Ψ˜j,j′ can then be written as
Ψ˜j,j′ = ej1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ejk ⊗ Φj,j′ ⊗ ej′k+n+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ej′2k+n
where Φj,j′ ∈ Sym2k+n(H¯). According to Lemma III.6,
there exists a vector Φˆj,j′ of the form
Φˆj,j′ =
√
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
fν ⊗ Φˆj,j′,ν ∈ H′ ⊗ Symk+n(H¯)
with Φˆj,j′,ν ∈ Symk+n(H¯, ν⊗n) such that
〈Φˆj,j′ |(U ⊗ 1⊗k+n)Φj,j′〉 > 1− kde−
k(k+1)
2k+n ,
7where U is some fixed isometry (independent of j′). With
the definition
Ψˆj,j′ = ej1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ejk ⊗ Φˆj,j′ ⊗ ej′k+n+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ej′2k+n
this immediately implies
〈Ψˆj,j′ |(1⊗k ⊗ U ⊗ 1⊗2k+n)Ψ˜j,j′〉 > 1− kde−
k(k+1)
2k+n .
Consider now the vector
Ψˆj :=
∑
j′∈J2k+nk+n
αj,j′Ψˆj,j′ .
Since, for any two distinct j′, j′′ ∈ J2k+nk+n , the projectors
Qj′ and Qj′′ are mutually orthogonal by definition, we
have
〈Ψˆj,j′ |(1⊗k ⊗ U ⊗ 1⊗2k+n)Ψ˜j,j′′〉
= 〈Ψˆj,j′ |(1⊗k ⊗ U ⊗Qj′Qj′′)Ψ˜j,j′′〉 = 0 .
Combining this with the above, we find
〈Ψˆj|(1⊗k ⊗ U ⊗ 1⊗2k+n)Ψ˜j〉
=
∑
j′
|αj,j′ |2〈Ψˆj,j′ |(1⊗k ⊗ U ⊗ 1⊗2k+n)Ψ˜j,j′〉
> 1− kde−k(k+1)2k+n .
This inequality can be rewritten in terms of the fidelity,
which is simply the absolute value of the scalar product.
Together with the fact that tracing out subsystems can
only increase the fidelity, we obtain
F
(
tr2k(|Ψ˜j〉〈Ψ˜j|), trH′,k(|Ψˆj〉〈Ψˆj|)
)
> 1− kde−k(k+1)2k+n .
Furthermore, because the density operator tr2k(|Ψ˜j〉〈Ψ˜j|)
is contained in the symmetric subspace Sym2k+n(H), we
can insert a projection onto this subspace without chang-
ing the fidelity, i.e.,
F
(
tr2k(|Ψ˜j〉〈Ψ˜j|), ρˆ2k+nj
)
> 1− kde− k(k+1)2k+n ,
where
ρˆ2k+nj := PSym2k+n(H)trk,H′(|Ψˆj〉〈Ψˆj|)PSym2k+n(H) .
It remains to verify that the density operator ρˆ2k+nj is
of the desired form
ρˆ2k+nj =
∑
ν∈V
pν ρˆ
2k+n
j,ν (17)
for some appropriately chosen probabilities pν and for
ρˆ2k+nj,ν contained in the subspace Sym
2k+n(H, ν⊗n). For
this, we define
ρˆ2k+nj,ν := PSym2k+n(H)PΨˆj,νPSym2k+n(H)
where PΨˆj,ν denotes the projector onto the vector
Ψˆj,ν := 〈ej1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ejk ⊗ fν |Ψˆj .
Identity (17) then follows from the orthogonality of the
vectors fν . Furthermore, by the definition of Ψˆj and
using the fact that the vectors Φˆj,j′,ν , for any fixed ν
and arbitrary j′, are contained in the support of P k+nν⊗n ,
one can readily verify that the vector Ψˆj,ν is contained
in the support of P 2k+nν⊗n . Consequently, ρˆ
2k+n
j,ν lies in the
subspace Sym2k+n(H, ν⊗n).
E. Properties of almost i.i.d. states
Theorem III.7 gives an approximation of permutation
invariant states in terms of almost i.i.d. states ρν . The
significance of this approximation comes from the fact
that such states are relatively easy to handle. In partic-
ular, their properties very much resemble the properties
of (perfect) i.i.d. states [2, 3]. For example, the entropy
of an almost i.i.d. state ρν is well approximated by the
entropy of the corresponding perfect i.i.d. state .
Of particular interest for information-theoretic appli-
cations is the smooth min-entropy [3, 26]. Let ρXB be a
density operator on HX ⊗HB which is classical on HX ,
i.e.,
ρXB =
∑
x∈X
px|ex〉〈ex| ⊗ ρxB ,
for some orthonormal basis {ex}x∈X of HX , probabil-
ities px, and density operators ρ
x
B on HB. Then, for
any ε ≥ 0, the ε-smooth entropy of X given B, denoted
Hεmin(X |B)ρ, corresponds to the amount of uniform ran-
domness (relative to B) that can be extracted from X
by two-universal hashing [27]. (The smoothness param-
eter ε quantifies the quality of the resulting randomness
in terms of their distance to a random variable which is
perfectly uniform and independent of B).
For an i.i.d. state ρ⊗NXB, the smooth min-entropy H
ε
min
is asymptotically (for largeN) equal to the von Neumann
entropy S, i.e.,
1
N
Hεmin(X
N |BN )ρ⊗N ≈
1
N
(
S(ρ⊗NXB)− S(ρ⊗NB )
)
= S(ρXB)− S(ρB) = S(X |B) .
The following theorem from [3] extends (one direction
of) this relation to almost i.i.d. states.
Theorem III.8. Let ρXk+nBk+n be a density operator
on (HX ⊗ HB)⊗k+n which is classical on the subsys-
tems HX and let ε > 0. If there exists a purification of
ρXk+nBk+n in Sym
k+n(HX ⊗HB ⊗HR, ν⊗n), for some
ν ∈ HX ⊗HB ⊗HR, then
1
n
Hεmin(X
k+n|Bk+n)ρk+n ≥ S(σXB)− S(σB)− δ ,
8where σXB := trR(|ν〉〈ν|),
δ := 5(ln(dimHX) + 1)
√
2 ln(4/ε)
k+n + h(
k
k+n ) ,
and h(p) ≡ −p ln p− (1− p) ln(1− p).
Note that the statement depends on the dimension of
HX , but is independent of the dimension of HB.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Putting things together
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the tech-
nical statements of Section III can be combined to give
our main claim, namely that any permutation invariant
state ρN on H⊗N is approximated by a mixture of states
with almost i.i.d. structure, provided the outcomes of cer-
tain measurements on a (small) sample of the subsystems
lie in a given range. To illustrate this, we assume for con-
creteness that H = L2(R) and that measurements on k
subsystems are carried out with respect to two canoni-
cal observables X and Y , each chosen with probability
1
2 . (According to Remark III.4, the argument below can
easily be extended to more general measurements.) Fur-
thermore, we assume that N = m4 and k = m3, for some
m ∈ N.
Let d = m
3
2 and let H¯ be the support of PX2+Y 2≤n0
for some n0 ∈ N such that 12 ln(7m) ≤ n0 ≤ d. We first
apply Lemma III.3 to infer that, if all k measurement out-
comes z1, . . . , zk satisfy z
2
i ≤ no2 then the state ρ(m−1)k
on the remaining (m−1)k subsystems is almost certainly
contained in the support of P
(m−1)k
H¯⊗(m−2)k . Hence, according
to Lemma III.5, there exists a purification ρ¯(m−1)k of
ρ(m−1)k on Sym(m−1)k(H⊗H, (H¯ ⊗ H¯)⊗(m−3)k). The-
orem III.7 now provides an approximation of the re-
duced state ρ¯(m−5)k in terms of a mixture of almost
i.i.d. states ρˆ
(m−5)k
ν , parametrized by ν ∈ H¯ ⊗ H¯. More
precisely, each density operator ρˆ
(m−5)k
ν is contained in
Sym(m−5)k(H ⊗H, ν⊗((m−9)k), and their convex combi-
nation is exponentially (in m) close to ρ¯(m−5)k. In par-
ticular, by taking the trace over the purifying systems,
we conclude that the reduced state ρ(1−µ)N is approxi-
mated by a mixture of states that have i.i.d. structure
on (1 − µ − µ′)N subsystems, where µ = 5N− 14 and
µ′ = 4N−
1
4 .
B. Application to QKD
A main application of de Finetti’s representation theo-
rem is in the area of quantum information theory. As ex-
plained in the introduction, the theorem can be employed
for the analysis of schemes involving a large number of
information carriers, whose joint state may be difficult
to describe in general. A typical and practically relevant
example is QKD, where the challenge is to find security
proofs that take into account all possible attacks of an
adversary.
Most QKD protocols can be subdivided into two parts.
In the first part, also known as distribution phase, the two
legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, use an (insecure) quan-
tum communication channel in order to distribute corre-
lated information. (Alternatively, in an entanglement-
based scheme [6], Alice and Bob receive this correlated
information as an input from an external source, which
may be controlled by an adversary.) In the second part,
the distillation phase, Alice and Bob process this informa-
tion to extract a pair of secret keys. This process usually
only involves classical communication (over an authentic
channel).
The analysis based on de Finetti’s theorem sketched
below applies to a large class of QKD schemes, which in-
cludes almost all protocols proposed in the literature [39].
More concretely, the following conditions must hold.
1. We assume that the information held by Alice
and Bob after the distribution phase consists of N
parts, for some sufficiently large N . The proto-
col should be invariant under permutations of these
parts. This requirement is usually satisfied because
each of the N signals is prepared, sent, and received
independently of the other signals.
2. In the last step of the distillation phase, the final
key is computed in a classical post-processing pro-
cedure consisting of information reconciliation (er-
ror correction) and privacy amplification by two-
universal hashing [27]. As yet, no alternative
method for distilling the final key is known, so this
criterion is not restrictive [40].
3. The protocol must perform a measurement M =
{Mz}z∈Z on a sample of the received signals and
only continue if all outcomes z are contained in a
given set Z¯ ⊂ Z that allows to conclude that the
dimension of the relevant Hilbert space H¯ is finite
(cf. Remark III.4). Note that this requirement is
trivial if the signal space already has small dimen-
sion.
A concrete example in H = L2(R) are measure-
ments M with respect to two canonical observ-
ables X and Y , each of them chosen with prob-
ability 12 . The set Z¯ can then be defined as the
set of all outcomes z such that z2 ≤ n02 and H¯ is
the space spanned by the eigenvectors of X2 + Y 2
corresponding to eigenvalues larger than n0, for
some appropriately chosen n0 (see Lemma III.2 and
Lemma III.3).
According to Property 1, if a key distilled from N sig-
nals in state ρN is secure then the same is true for the key
distilled from a permuted state piρNpi†, for any permuta-
tion pi ∈ SN . We can thus assume without loss of gen-
erality that the N signals are permuted at random and,
9hence, their state ρN is permutation invariant. Now, ac-
cording to the argument in Section IVA and using Prop-
erty 3, we conclude that ρN
′
, for some N ′ ≈ N , is ap-
proximated by a mixture of almost i.i.d. states ρν (see
previous section for explicit parameters). Finally, we use
Property 2, which implies that the only relevant quantity
is the smooth min-entropy [26] of the measured data XN
conditioned on the adversary’s information EN (see [3]
for a detailed argument). By Theorem III.8, the smooth
min-entropy of almost i.i.d. states is approximated by
the corresponding entropy of i.i.d. states [41] Hence, we
can without loss of generality assume that ρN is an i.i.d.
state, which could equivalently be the result of a collec-
tive attack. Summarizing, we have thus proved that any
QKD protocol satisfying the above three conditions is se-
cure against general attacks whenever it is secure against
collective attacks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that permutation invariant states on
large N -partite systems are approximated by a convex
combination of almost i.i.d. states, provided measure-
ments on a few subsystems with respect to certain ob-
servables only give bounded values. In particular, under
this condition, a permutation invariant state can be con-
sidered equal to an unknown i.i.d. state, except an arbi-
trarily small fraction of the subsystems. This has vari-
ous implications. Of particular interest to experimental
physics is that state tomography can be employed with-
out the need for i.i.d. assumptions, as discussed in [2] for
the special case of low-dimensional systems.
Applied to quantum cryptography, our result enables
full security proofs for QKD schemes in the (practically
relevant case) where the dimension of the signal space
may be unbounded. This is an intrinsic property of con-
tinuous variable protocols, but the necessity of taking
into account infinite-dimensional systems may also arise
in the analysis of discrete variable schemes, for instance
when they are implemented using weak coherent pulses
(see, e.g., [28]). The security of these schemes has been
investigated intensively, but most proofs are only valid
under the assumption of collective attacks (see Introduc-
tion for references and [42]). The de Finetti representa-
tion theorem derived here allows to drop this assumption,
implying that security holds against all possible attacks.
The main requirement is that certain tests are carried
out on a sample of the transmitted signals. For continu-
ous variable protocols with signal states on H = L2(R),
one possibility is to check that measurements with re-
spect to two canonical observables only result in small
outcomes. By modifying Lemma III.2, one may replace
this requirement by a criterion based on alternative mea-
surable quantities such as the photon number [29].
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA III.1
The proof is based on the following lemma, which
states that the statistics obtained from the observation
of k out of k + n binary values X1, X2, . . . , Xk+n gives a
good estimate for the probability distribution of any of
the remaining values, provided the overall distribution is
permutation invariant.
Lemma A.1. Let n ≥ k and let PX1,...,Xk+n be a permu-
tation invariant probability distribution over {0, 1}k+n.
Then
Pr
[|p|X1···...Xk − fX1···Xk | ≥ δ] ≤ 2k 32 e−kδ2 ,
where, for any x = (x1, . . . , xk), p|x denotes the proba-
bility that Xk+1 = 1 conditioned on (X1, . . . , Xk) = x.
Proof. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xk). We show that
E
[
ek(p|X−fX)
2] ≤ 2k 32 , (A1)
where E[·] denotes the expectation value. The claim then
follows because, by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
[|p|X − fX| ≥ δ] = Pr[ek(p|X−fX)2 ≥ ekδ2]
≤ E[ek(p|X−fX)2]e−kδ2 ≤ 2k 32 e−kδ2 .
To show (A1) we use the observation that, for any per-
mutation invariant distribution PZ1···Zk of binary values,
the distribution of any individual value Zi equals the ex-
pectation of the frequency distribution of the whole tuple
(Z1, . . . , Zk), i.e.,
Pr[Zi = 1] = E[fZ1···Zk ] .
In particular, we have for any x = (x1, . . . , xk),
p|x = E[fXk+1···X2k |X = x] .
Using convexity of the function x 7→ ex2 , we get
ek(p|x−fx)
2
= ekE[fXk+1···X2k−fX|X=x]
2
≤ E[ek(fXk+1···X2k−fX)2∣∣X = x]
and, hence,
E
[
ek(p|X−fX)
2] ≤ E[ek(fXk+1···X2k−fX)2] .
It thus remains to be shown that
E
[
ek(fXk+1···X2k−fX1···Xk )
2] ≤ 2k 32 . (A2)
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for any permutation invariant distribution PX1···X2k .
Because any permutation invariant distribution can be
written as a convex combination of permutation invariant
distributions with fixed frequency distribution, we can
without loss of generality assume that fX1···X2k =
r
2k
holds with certainty for any fixed r ∈ {0, . . . , 2k}. The
expectation value on the left hand side of (A2) is then
given explicitly as
E
[
ek(fXk+1···X2k−fX1···Xk )
2]
=
min(r,k)∑
s=max(0,r−k)
(
k
s
)(
k
r−s
)
(
2k
r
) ek( sk− r−sk )2
=
min(r,k)∑
s=max(0,r−k)
e−k(rk,r,s−(
s
k− r−sk )2) (A3)
where
rk,r,s =
1
k
ln
(
2k
r
)
(
k
s
)(
k
r−s
) . (A4)
To bound the term rk,r,s we use an approximation of
the binomial coefficient by Wozencraft and Reiffen [31]
(see also Lemma 17.5.1 of [32])
eNh(p)√
8Ng(p)
≤
(
N
pN
)
≤ e
Nh(p)√
piNg(p)
,
where h(p) ≡ −p ln p − (1 − p) ln(1 − p) is the binary
entropy function (written with respect to the basis e)
and where g(p) ≡ p(1− p). The approximation holds for
any N ∈ N and 0 < p < 1 such that pN ∈ N. Because
g(p) ≤ 14 for any p, the first inequality implies(
N
pN
)
≥ e
Nh(p)
√
2N
.
Furthermore, since g(p) ≥ 12N for any N > 1 and 1N ≤
p ≤ 1− 1N , the second inequality implies the well known
upper bound (
N
pN
)
≤ eNh(p) ,
which also holds for N = 1, p = 0, and p = 1. Inserting
these bounds into (A4), we find
rk,r,s ≥ 2h( r
2k
)− h( s
k
)− h(r − s
k
)− 1
2k
ln(4k) . (A5)
Using some standard analysis, one finds that
2h(
α+ β
2
)− h(α)− h(β) ≥ (α− β)2
for any α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Combining this with (A5) and
inserting in (A3) yields (A2) and thus concludes the
proof.
The following lemma is an immediate corollary of
Lemma A.1, applied to the sequence of values obtained
from measurements of a permutation invariant state.
Lemma A.2. Let n ≥ k, let U = {U0, U1} be a binary
POVM on H, let ρk+n ∈ S(H⊗k+n) be permutation in-
variant, and let (X1, . . . , Xk) be the outcome of the mea-
surement U⊗k applied to the first k subsystems of ρk+n.
Then
Pr
[|tr(U1ρ1|X1···Xk)− fX1···Xk | ≥ δ] ≤ 2k 32 e−kδ2 ,
where, for any x = (x1, . . . , xk), ρ
1
|x is the reduced state
on a single subsystem conditioned on the measurement
outcome (X1, . . . , Xk) = x.
We are now ready to prove Lemma III.1
Proof of Lemma III.1. Let Xk := (X1, . . . , Xk) and
Xn/2 := (Xk+1, . . . , Xk+n/2) (where, for simplicity, we
assume that n is even). Applying Lemma A.2 to the
density operator ρ|Xn/2 describing the state conditioned
on the outcomes of measurement V⊗n/2 applied to n/2
subsystems of ρk+n, we get
Pr
[|tr(U1ρ1|XkXn/2)− fXk | ≥ δ] ≤ 2k 32 e−kδ2 . (A6)
Similarly and using n/2 ≥ k we find
Pr
[|tr(V1ρ1|XkXn/2)− fXn/2 | ≥ δ] ≤ 2k 32 e−kδ2 . (A7)
By the definition of the quantity γU1→V1 , we have
Pr[fXn/2 > γU1→V1(fXk + δ) + δ
]
= Pr[
[
∄σ : (tr(U1σ) ≤ fXk + δ)∧ (tr(V1σ) ≥ fXn/2 − δ)
]
≤ Pr[(tr(U1ρ1|XkXn/2) > fXk+δ)∨(tr(V1ρ1|XkXn/2) < fXn/2−δ)]
≤ 4k 32 e−kδ2 ,
where the last inequality follows from (A6) and (A7), and
the union bound.
To conclude the proof, we use the observation that
fXk+1···Xk+n =
1
2
fXk+1···Xk+n/2 +
1
2
fXk+n/2+1···Xk+n
which implies
Pr[fXk+1···Xk+n > γU1→V1(fXk + δ) + δ
]
≤ Pr[fXk+1···Xk+n/2 > γU1→V1(fXk + δ) + δ
]
+ Pr[fXk+n/2+1···Xk+n > γU1→V1(fXk + δ) + δ
]
≤ 8k 32 e−kδ2 .
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